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ANCIENT, ANTIQUATED & ARCHAIC: SOUTH
CAROLINA FAILS TO EMBRACE THE RULE THAT
A GRANTOR MAY RESERVE AN EASEMENT IN
FAVOR OF A THIRD PARTY
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent case, Springob v. Farrar,' the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that an appurtenant easement in a deed of sale, reserving access to a well
on an adjoining lot, was actually an easement in gross.2 The court reached this
conclusion, in part, because of the inconsistencies in South Carolina law
regarding the admissibility of evidence to effectuate a grantor's intent.3
Although the court recognized that the cardinal rule in South Carolina is to
effectuate the grantor's intent, it refused to do so in this case.4 Consequently,
the court failed to consider the viability of the stranger to the deed rule, stating
that "the question of the rule's viability is purely academic."5
In an articulated and well-reasoned dissent, Judge Anderson argued that
parol evidence should be admissible to effectuate the grantor's intent.6 Judge
Anderson further reasoned that the common law rule prohibiting the creation
of an interest in a stranger to the deed was no longer viable.7 In reaching this
conclusion, Judge Anderson stated that "the efficacy of the common law rule
in modem property relationships is obsolete and lacking in any utilitarian value.
Moreover, the rule is antiquated and in direct contradiction with our cardinal
rule of construction, which is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
parties.
This Note, in Part II, first reviews the Springob case in detail. Part III
outlines the differences between, and the elements required for, an appurtenant
easement verses an easement in gross. Part IV traces the foundation of deed
interpretation in South Carolina, while Part V complements the preceding
issues by outlining the type of evidence that is admissible to effectuate the
grantor's intent. Finally, this Note suggests that the Supreme Court of South
Carolina should have followed the cutting edge lead of other jurisdictions, as
well as Judge Anderson's dissent, by overruling the antiquated common law
1. 334 S.C. 585,514 S.E.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied (May 8,1999), cert. denied
(Sept. 24, 1999).
2. Id. at 589, 514 S.E.2d at 138.
3. Id. at 590, 514 S.E.2d 138.
4. Id. at 594, 514 S.E.2d 140.
5. Id. at 592, 514 S.E.2d at 139.
6. Id. at 593, 514 S.E.2d at 140.




Lansche: Ancient, Antiquated & Archaic: South Carolina Fails to Embrace th
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rule that a grantor cannot reserve an easement in a third party through a single
instrument of conveyance.
H. SPRINGOB v FARRAR
Dr. Narayan R. Shenoy owned an unimproved lot (Lot 14) in Block H of
the Spring Valley Subdivision in Columbia, South Carolina. 9 His wife,
Sulochana N. Shenoy, owned the contiguous lot (Lot 13) where the couple
resided.' The couple titled Lot 13 in Mrs. Shenoy's name and Lot 14 in Dr.
Shenoy's name.' Prior to May 1996, the Shenoys dug a well on Lot 14 and
immediately connected the well to a new irrigation system located around their
house on Lot 13.2 The electric power for the well pump (located on Lot 14)
was connected to the electric service for Lot 13." The Shenoys continuously
enjoyed the benefit of the well while they resided on Lot 13.'"
On May 19, 1986, Dr. Shenoy deeded Lot 14 to L.G.B., Inc. 5 The
Contract of Sale stated, inter alia: "Seller to reserve perpetual easement for the
continual operation of maintenance [sic] of water well which straddles property
line & fence that extends over property line. (Seller shall acquire easement
rights).'
' 6
The attorney who prepared the deed of Lot 14 from Dr. Shenoy to L.G.B.,
Inc., knew that the contract reserved a perpetual easement for Dr. Shenoy to
operate the well on Lot 14." However, the attorney testified that he did not
know that the well on Lot 14 was connected to the irrigation system on Lot
13.1 Moreover, the attorney mistakenly believed that Lot 13 was titled to Dr.
Shenoy and not to his wife.' 9 The deed prepared by the attorney to convey Lot
14 from Dr. Shenoy to L.G.B., Inc., and reserve an easement for Dr. Shenoy
states, in relevant part:
There is reserved to the Grantor an easement from Lot
Thirteen (13), Block H, onto the hereinabove described
premises [Lot 14] for ingress and egress to and for the
maintenance and operation of a well situated on said Lot
9. Id. at 587,514 S.E.2d 136.
10. Id.




14. Id. at 5.
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Fourteen (14), Block H adjacent to the lot line between Lots
Fourteen (14) and Lot Thirteen (13) Block H.20
That same day, L.B.G., Inc., immediately deeded Lot 14 to its partner,
Irwin Marmostein, d/b/a Irbo Developers.2' The same attorney who drafted the
deed from Dr. Shenoy to L.B.G., Inc., preserved the easement, in relevant part,
as follows:
There is reserved to Narayan R. Shenoy and [sic] easement
from Lot Thirteen (13), Block H, onto the hereinabove
described premises [Lot 14] for ingress and egress to and for
the maintenance and operation of a well situated on said Lot
Fourteen (14) Block H, adjacent to the lot line between Lots
Fourteen (14) and Lot Thirteen (13), Block H.'
The deeds contained essentially the same language reserving an easement for
the benefit of Lot 13 and burdening Lot 14.
Subsequently, Irbo Developers constructed a house on Lot 14.23 On August
1, 1988, Irbo sold Lot 14 to the Farrars.2' The deed from Irbo Developers to the
Farrars did not specifically mention an easement.2" The deed stated that "[t]his
conveyance is subject to all easements, rights, reservations, restrictions and
covenants of record affecting said property."" When the Farrars purchased the
lot, the closing attorney informed them about the existence of the easement on
their property.27
During the next year, the Shenoys continued to live on Lot 13 while the
Farrars lived on Lot 14.28 The Shenoys maintained exclusive use and control
of the well on Lot 14 to operate their sprinkler system on Lot 13.29 The well did
not connect to any sprinkler system on Lot 14, and the Farrars knew that the
well exclusively serviced the Shenoy's sprinkler system on Lot 13.30
After moving onto Lot 14, the Farrars installed a sprinkler system for the
benefit of their lot.31 They connected the sprinkler system on Lot 14 to the city
water supply instead of drilling a well on their property.32 As a result, the
20. Springob v. Farrar, No. 96-CP-40-1174, at 3 (S.C. Cir. Ct. July 7, 1997) (order of
special referee holding that the easement was in gross).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Appellant at 5, Springob (No. 96-CP-40-1174).
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Springob, No. 96-CP-40-1174, at 3.
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Farrars often incurred water bills as high as $200.00 per month to irrigate their
yard during the summer.33
On May 19, 1989, Mrs. Shenoy sold Lot 13 to Kenneth and Ellen Perry.34
While the Perrys owned Lot 13, they continued to use the well located on Lot
14 forthe exclusive benefit of their irrigation system on Lot 1 In early1993,
South Carolina Federal Savings Bank obtained title to Lot 13 in a foreclosure
proceeding, and the house on Lot 13 remained vacant for at least four months.36
During this time, the Farrars disconnected the sprinkder system and electrical
service from Lot 13 and reconnected the well and electrical service to the
sprinkler system located on their property (Lot 14).3"
Mr. V. Les Springob subsequently purchased Lot 13 from the lender and
moved onto the property.3" At the time of purchase, Springob did not know
about the easement, and the Farrars represented to Springob that they owned
the well.39 When Springob later learned about the easement from a copy of the
L.G.B. Deed, he demanded that the Farrars surrender the well for the benefit
of his property.40 The Farrars refused.4' After the dispute arose, Dr. Shenoy and
his wife executed and recorded a "Corrective Title to Real Estate" and an
"Easement Agreement" to clarify that Dr. Shenoy created an appurtenant
easement in perpetuity for the owner of Lot 13 to have access to the well on
Lot 14.42
Springob eventually sued Farrar for "trespass and intentional interference
with and obstruction of an easement."'43 At trial, the Special Referee found that
because "Narayan R. Shenoy only reserved the easement to himself the
easement was an 'Easement in gross' and a mere personal privilege to use the
lands of the Grantee for the uses reserved and incapable of transfer to
another."" Further, the Special Referee found that the easement was incapable
of being classified as an "appurtenant easement" and "that South Carolina
follows the Common Law rule that a reservation in a deed cannot create an
33. Id.
34. Springob, No. 96-CP-40-1174, at 2.
35. Brief for Appellant at 6, Springob (No. 96-CP-40-1174).
36. Id. First Union National Bank of South Carolina, as successor by merger with South
Carolina Federal Savings Bank, actually deeded Lot 13 to Mr. Springob. Springob, No. 96-CP-
40-1174, at 2.
37. Brief for Appellant at 6, Springob (No. 96-CP-40-1174).
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. Springob relied on the Fararr's representations about the well ownership because




43. Springob v. Farrar, 334 S.C. at 588, 514 S.E.2d at 137.
44. Springob, No. 96-CP-40-1174, at 4.
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easement in favor of a third party."45 Springob's motion to reconsider was
denied and an appeal followed.'
III. APPURTENANT EASEMENTS VS. EASEMENTS IN GROSS
There are two types of easements in American Jurisprudence-the
appurtenant easement and the easement in gross. 7 In Fisher v. Fair,4 the
Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the ruling in Whaley v. Stevens49
that a "right of way appurtenant is a right which inheres in the land to which it
[is] appurtenant, is necessary to its enjoyment, and passes with the land, while
a right of way in gross is a mere personal privilege, which dies with the person
who may have acquired it."50 More specifically, in Steele v. Williams, 1 the
court noted:
The important difference between a way appurtenant and one
in gross.., is that a way in gross is an individual right, non-
transferable, and dying with the claimant. A way appurtenant,
however, makes the estate to which it is attached a dominant
estate and the one over which it runs a servient one, and this
relation lasts as long as the estates last, and it inheres, not
only in the dominant estate as a whole, but to every portion
and subdivision thereof. It is a complete servitude which runs
with the land. It would seem in principle, therefore, that
before such an important right should be acquired by one
close over another that there should be some necessity
therefor, it should not be a mere matter of convenience. [The
court further noted that] "ways are said to be appendant or
appurtenant when they are incident to an estate; one terminus
being on the land of the party claiming. They must inhere in
45. Id. (citing Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952)).
46. Springob v. Farrar, No. 96-CP-40-1174, at 2 (S.C. Sept. 18, 1997) (order of the special
referee denying Springob's motion to reconsider).
47. See infra note 50.
48. 34 S.C. 203, 13 S.E. 470 (1891).
49. 27 S.C. 549, 4 S.E. 145 (1887).
50. Fisher, 34 S.C. at 208, 13 S.E. at 472; see Safety Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Lyles, 131 S.C.
542, 546, 128 S.E. 724, 725 (1925) (affirming the holding in Fisher that easements must either
be appurtenant or in gross). For a detailed analysis of the easement in gross, see generally Alan
David Hegi, Note, The Easement in Gross Revisited: Transferability andDivisibility Since 1945,
39 VAND. L. REv. 109 (1986).
51. 204 S.C. 124,28 S.E.2d 644 (1944) (quoting Whaley v. Stevens, 27 S.C. 549, 560, 4
S.E. 145, 147 (1887)).
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the land, concern the premises, and be essentially necessary
to their enjoyment."52
Generally speaking, an appurtenant easement attaches to a certain piece of
land for the benefit of the easement holder.53 The benefitted estate is known as
the "dominant tenement" and the burdened estate is the "servient tenement."' 4
Conversely, an easement in gross is a benefit personal to its holder and is not
tied to any particular parcel.5"
South Carolina courts adhere strictly to the requirements foran appurtenant
easement. While a majority ofjurisdictions hold that an appurtenant easement
"must inhere in the land, [and touch and] concern the premises," South
Carolina adds the additional requirements that an appurtenant easement "be
essentially necessary to the enjoyment thereof" and "have one terminus on the
land of the party claiming it." 6 Without the requirement of a terminus on the
dominant estate, what would be an appurtenant easement in other jurisdictions
becomes an easement in gross under South Carolina law. 7 It is also well settled
that unless an easement has all of the elements essential to be considered
appurtenant, the courts will characterize the easement as an easement in gross.5"
The facts of Springob indicate that the appurtenant easement met the test 9
to transfer the easement with the dominant estate." As such, the easement for
the well clearly inhered in the land. After all, it is impossible to remove a well
from one location and transfer it to another. Additionally, the easement was
52. Id. at 130,28 S.E.2d at 646-47; see also Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 246 S.C. 414,
420, 143 S.E.2d 803, 806 (1965) (stating that "[a]n appendant or appurtenant easement must
inhere in the land, concern the premises, have one terminus on the land of the party claiming it,
and be essentially necessary to the enjoyment thereof. It attaches to, and passes with, the
dominant tenement as an appurtenance thereof. An easement, or right-of-way, in gross is a mere
personal privilege to the owner of the land and incapable of transfer by him, and is not, therefore
assignable or inheritable.").
53. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 453 (1944).
54. 12 S.C. JuRis. Easements § 2 (1992).
55. Id. Another type ofeasement, the "quasi easement," is an easement-like right that arises
when two tracts of land are owned by the same person. Because a landowner cannot have an
easement over his or her own property, the notion of a quasi easement arises. A quasi easement
may develop into an easement appurtenant or easement in gross if the landowner sells one of the
tracts. HERBERTTHORNDIKE TIFFANY, ATREATISE ON THE MODERNLAW OFREAL PROPERTY AND
OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND §540 (1940).
56. Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 245, 141 S.E. 375, 382 (1927).
57. An appurtenant easement remains with the property whenever title to either the servient
estate or the dominant estate is transferred. However, most courts hold that an easement in gross
is usually not transferrable unless it is of a commercial nature. See 12 S.C. JURIs. Easements § 3
(1992).
58. Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318,326,487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997); 12 S.C.
JURIS. Easements § 3(c) (1999).
59. Both the majority test and the South Carolina test were met in this case.
60. See Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 217 S.E.2d 16 (1975) (affirming the
holding in Ragsdale, infra note 62, that an appurtenant easement passes with the dominant estate
even if the conveyance of the dominant estate does not expressly mention it).
1024 Vol. 51: 1019
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essentially necessary for the enjoyment of the irrigation system as originally
designed. Because the South Carolina courts have never precisely defined what
"essentially necessary" means, it is entirely plausible that the well was
"essentially necessary" in this case because the sprinkler system was unable to
function after the Farrars disconnected it from the well. Moreover, the sprinkler
system had a terminus6' on the dominant estate, qualifying it as an appurtenant
easement under South Carolina law.
IV. DEED INTERPRETATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In South Carolina, the "cardinal rule of construction [of a deed] is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties, unless that intention
contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy."'62 It is also well
established that "the character of an express easement is determined by the
nature of the right and the intention of the parties creating it."'63 Without further
analysis the law of deed interpertation in South Carolina creating an easement
appears relatively straightforward. Unfortunately, such a conclusion is far from
reality in South Carolina. As Judge Anderson noted in his dissent in Springob,
"[t]he efficacy of the majority's opinion is to place the law of easements in a
continuum of confusion."" The Supreme Court of South Carolina was finally
in a position to clarify and update the easement law of South Carolina by
reversing the lower court's ruling. In choosing to ignore Judge Anderson's
warnings by denying certiorari, the Supreme Court has again contributed to the
ancient, antiquated, and archaic easement law of South Carolina.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
In 1998, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the interpretation
of a deed purporting to create an easement was "a question of fact in a law
action and subject to an any evidence standard of review when tried by ajudge
61. According to THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1399 (3d ed. 1993), a
terminus is "[t]he final point; the end." Although it can be argued that the sprinkler system did
not have a single terminus on the dominant estate within the historical meaning of the word, an
analogy can be drawn in this case to the many ends (sprinkler heads) of the sprinkler system on
the dominant estate.
62. Ragsdale, 246 S.C. at 420, 143 S.E.2d at 806; see Byars v. Cherokee County, 237 S.C.
548, 118 S.E.2d 324 (1961); Davis v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953). See, e.g.,
Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 239 S.E.2d 890 (1977); Lake View Acres Dev. Co. v. Tindal,
306 S.C. 477,412 S.E.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1991); Wall v. Huguenin, 301 S.C. 94,390 S.E.2d 372
(Ct. App. 1990); Batesburg-Leesville Sch. Dist. Number 3 v. Tarrant, 293 S.C. 442,361 S.E.2d
343 (Ct. App. 1987).
63. Smith v. Commissioners of Pub. Works, 312 S.C. 460,467,441 S.E.2d 331, 336 (Ct.
App. 1994). See generally 25 AM.JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 13 (1996) (stating that the
parties will determine what constitutes an express easement).
64. Springob v. Farrar, 334 S.C. at 593, 514 S.E.2d at 140.
2000 1025
7
Lansche: Ancient, Antiquated & Archaic: South Carolina Fails to Embrace th
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
without ajury.",6 In Townes Assocs, Ltd. v. City of Greenville," the court held
that an appellate court can make its own findings of fact for an action in equity
first tried by a special referee. 7 Tupper" also adopted this position and noted
that the determination of the existence of an easement was a question in
equity.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has also held that, as a general rule,
"[p]arol evidence is admissible to elucidate latent ambiguities in written
instruments generally."7 In an odd departure from this broad standard of
review and evidentiary interpretation, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
also held, as recently as 1986, that "[t]he terms of... a deed may not be varied
or contradictedby evidence drawn from sources other than the deed itself [even
though] the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated, unless
that intention contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy."7'
Other cases hold that in effectuating the grantor's intent, the court must
interpret the deed as a whole and cannot contradict an unambiguous deed with
evidence drawn from other sources.72 When additional evidence can only come
from the deed itself, it is difficult to effectuate the any evidence standard of
review. Given these holdings, it is clear that the standard of deed interpretation
in South Carolina is far from "well settled."
VI. EFFECrUATINGTHEPARTIES' INTENT: ABOLISHING THE STRANGERTO THE
DEED RULE
At common law, a property owner could not create a deed in favor of a
stranger to the title.73 The rule originally developed based on feudal
considerations and early common law courts upheld the rule because they
"mistrusted and wished to limit conveyance by deed as a substitute for livery
by seisin."74 However, the trend in modem American jurisprudence is to allow
a grantor to create a reservation or exception to a stranger to the deed. In the
leading case, Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica,75 the
Supreme Court of California rejected the common law rule's mistrust
65. Slearv. Hanna, 329 S.C. 407,410,496 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1998).
66. 266 S.C. at 81, 221 S.E.2d at 773 (1976).
67. Id. at 86, 221 S.E.2d at 776.
68. 326 S.C. 318, 487 S.E.2d 187 (1997).
69. Id. at 323, 487 S.E.2d at 190.
70. Richardson v. Register, 227 S.C. 81, 88, 87 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1955) (applying this
standard to deed interpretation).
71. Vause v. Mikell by Solomonic, 290 S.C. 65,68,348 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1986);
see supra note 62.
72. Gardner v. Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 25, 358 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1987); cf Douglas v.
Medical Investors, Inc., 256 S.C. 440, 182 S.E.2d 720 (197 1) (stating that there is no well settled
rule of law that would prohibit giving effect to the parties' intent when interpreting a deed).
73. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987, 989 (Cal. 1972).
74. Id.
75. Id.
1026 Vol. 51: 1019
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/19
PROPERTY LAW
foundation because "it [was] clearly an inapposite feudal shackle today."76 In
that case, the court also rejected the rule because it frustrated the grantor's
intent." More specifically, the court noted that the rule was unfair and
produced an inequitable result because "the original grantee has presumably
paid a reduced price for title to the encumbered property. '7' After balancing
both equitable and policy considerations, the Willard court concluded that the
grantor's intent should be effectuated and, therefore, overruled the antiquated
common law rule.79
In reaching its conclusion, the Willard court relied on two previous
decisions which favored effectuating the grantor's intent by establishing an
interest in favor of a third party rather than following the archaic common law
rule. The Supreme Court of Oregon held in Garza v. Grayson"° that the
grantor's intent to reserve an interest in a third party should not be defeated
merely because the third party was not a party to the deed."1 In that case, the
defendants attempted to prevent a sewer line easement from burdening their
property." Ultimately, the court stated that the grantor intended
to impose the servitude upon defendants' land for the benefit
of the land previously conveyed to plaintiffs. The grantor
himself testified that this was his purpose. Considering the
location of the easement in relation to the surrounding land,
it is difficult to conceive of the easement as having any other
purpose than to benefit plaintiffs' land. 3
A substantial parallel can be drawn from the facts of that case to the facts of
Springob. Given the close proximity and function of the easement that Dr.
Shenoy created, together with the contract of sale and his testimony (in the
form of a "Corrective Title to Real Estate" and "Easement Agreement"), the
cases are virtually identical."
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. By allowing an easement to be reserved to a stranger to the deed, the Willard court
also made it easier for future purchasers to know what reservations lie in their chain of title.
More specifically, by allowing an interest to be reserved to a stranger to the deed, it is more
likely that a future purchaser searching a title would find this reservation rather than if a separate
document was drafted to grant an interest and never recorded.
79. Id. at 991.
80. 467 P.2d 960 (Or. 1970).
81. Id. at961.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 962.
84. Because of the lawyer's mistaken belief that Dr. Shenoy owned both lots, these
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The Supreme Court of Kentucky was also on the cutting edge of easement
law in Townsend v. Cables when it had "no hesitancy in abandoning this
archaic and technical rule." '86 By overruling the common law, the court
determined that it should respect the grantor's intent and that minor
technicalities were irrelevant where the grantor's intention was clear.87
Subsequent to the precedent established by these leading cases, a number
of other jurisdictions overruled the antique common law rule as well.88
Curiously, only a small number of courts that have addressed the issue declined
to overrule the common law rule, favoring instead the principles of stare
decisis.89 As these courts noted, relying on the common law rule only frustrates
the parties' intentions. Now that livery ofseisin has been abolished perhaps the
appellate court would have ruled differently in Springob if Dr. Shenoy and the
subsequent grantors dressed in elaborate ritual costumes and symbolically
delivered possession of the easement with a twig, a clod, or a piece of turf.
Actually, a ceremonial raindance may have been more appropriate in this case.
The leading case in South Carolina, Glasgow v. Glasgow,° carved out an
exception to the common law rule. 9' In that case, a single instrument of
85. 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964).
86. Id. at 808.
87. Id.; see Hogan v. Blakney, 251 P.2d 209, 213 (Idaho 1952) (holding that deed
technicalities should be disregared and the real intention of the grantor should be effectuated).
88. More recent cases include, inter alia, Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987)
(rejecting justification for the rule and holding that a deed can create an easement in favor of a
third party); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. App. 1985) ((following the
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §472 (1944): "[b]y a single instrument of conveyance, there may
be created an estate in land in one person and an easement in another") in holding that a single
instrument of conveyance can create a new estate in one person while reserving an easement in
another); Nelson v. Parker, 670 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. App. 1996) (rejecting the common law rule and
effectuating the grantor's intent for an unambiguous deed); Enderle v. Sharman, 422 N.E.2d 686
(Ind. App. 198 1) (holding that a grantor cannot reserve a life estate to a stranger to the deed but
can convey an easement by reservation to a party who is a stranger to the deed); Medhus v.
Dutter, 603 P.2d 669 (Mont 1979) (recognizing that the intent of the grantor, as evidenced by
the grantor's testimony, to create an easement in favor of a stranger to the deed will prevail over
the common law rule); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 509 A.2d 252 (N.J. 1986)
(adhering to the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY rule that an easement can be created to a stranger
to the deed); Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1983) (effectuating the intent of the
grantor to create a property interest in a stranger to the deed should prevail over the common law
rule); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 514 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio App. 1986) (following
the more enlightened approach that a grantor can create an easement in one party and an estate
in land in anotherparty by a single instrument of conveyance); Simpson v. Kistler Inv. Co., 713
P.2d 751, 756 (Wyo. 1986) ("[j]oining the enlightened approach that intent should control and
that archaic and inappropriate feudalistic principles should no longer apply, this court determines
that the rule is repealed").
89. See Tripp v. Huff, 606 A.2d 792 (Me. 1992) (relying on the principals of stare decisis
as an excuse for not overruling the common law rule); Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d
309 (N.Y. 1987) (declining to follow the Willard court in rejecting the common law rule that a
property interest cannot be reserved in a strangerto the deed); Pitman v. Sweeney, 661 P.2d 153
(Wash. App. 1983) (holding that an easement cannot be created in a stranger to the deed).
90. 221 S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952).
91. Id. at 331, 70 S.E.2d at 435.
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conveyance attempted to create a fee estate in the grantor's son while
preserving a life estate in the grantor's wife.92 In concluding that the wife was
a stranger to the deed, the trial court held that although the grantor intended to
create two separate property interests through a single instrument of
conveyance, the court could not effectuate his intent because it violated the
common law rule.93 The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial
court and held that because the wife "had an inchoate right of dower in the
land, a homestead right and an expectancy of inheritance from her husband if
she survived him,... [she was] not a stranger to the title." 94 In short, the court
carved out an exception to the common law rule by allowing a grantor to
reserve an interest in his or her spouse even if the spouse is a stranger to the
deed.
In the present case, there is a strong argument that, at the very least, Dr.
Shenoy created this reservation for his wife. However, even if this was his
intent, the court's interpretation of an easement in gross then it would have
ended when Mrs. Shenoy sold her lot. As such, the exception in Glasgow95
does not parallel the real issues in this case. Nevertheless, it is a concrete
example of how South Carolina previously embraced the notion of allowing a
grantor to reserve an easement in favor of a third party.
VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
After acknowledging and effectuating the parties' intent, Dr. Shenoy
clearly did not intend for the easement to be personal to himself. Rather, he
intended the easement to burden Lot 14 for the benefit of Lot 13 in perpetuity.
Dr. Shenoy's intent is the only plausible explanation for his actions. After all,
although he did not "own" Lot 13, Dr. Shenoy did stand to benefit from the
added value which the easement undoubtedly vested in that property. Some
people may argue that the easement was in gross because Dr. Shenoy
personally benefitted from it as a resident of Lot 13. However, considering the
lawyer's mistaken belief that Dr. Shenoy owned both lots together with Dr.
Shenoy's later execution of the corrective instruments, he clearly intended for
the easement to be appurtenant to Lot 13.
The special referee held that "South Carolina follows the Common Law
rule that a reservation in a deed cannot create an easement in favor of a third
party."'96 In reaching this conclusion, the special referee erred by finding that
the grantor did not attempt to reserve an easement in anyone but himself.97 By
affirming this judgment, the majority in Springob further confounded the error
92. Id.
93. Id. at 325, 70 S.E.2d at 433.
94. Id. at 331, 70 S.E.2d at 435.
95. 221 S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952).
96. Springob v. Farrar, No. 96-CP-40-1174, at 4 (S.C. July 7, 1997) (order of special
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because the "Corrective Title to Real Estate" and "Easement Agreement" prove
distinctly that Dr. Shenoy intended to create an appurtenant easement in favor
of a third party.
Given these facts, the inconsistencies and ambiguities in South Carolina's
easement law cannot be overstated. Springob presented the majority with a
clear opportunity to clarify and update the law. However, the court chose not
to do so, leaving the state of easement law as confusing as ever.
If the cardinal rule of deed construction in South Carolina is to effectuate
the grantor's intent, the courts must consider all of the available evidence.
Favoring an antiquated common law rule which serves no purpose today only
frustrates the grantor's intent. These inconsistencies often allow the cardinal
rule to directly contradict the grantor's intent. In previous opinions, the
majority agreed that the "general rule is that the character of an express
easement is determined by the nature of the right and the intention of the parties
creating it."9 The majority author also held that "a determination of the width
of the easement becomes a matter of construction of the instrument with strong
consideration being given to what is reasonable, convenient and necessary to
accomplish the purpose for which the right-of-way was created."99 These
previous opinions only make the Springob holding even more illogical and
inconsistent.
By overruling the common law, states like California and Kentucky made
it easier for potential buyers conducting a title search to find encumbrances on
a specific tract of land. Under the common law rule, if a grantor wanted to
reserve an easement in favor of a third party he first had to execute a deed of
easement to that third person. Next, the grantor had to execute a deed to the
grantee. While there are numerous incentives for the grantee to record his deed,
the easement holder will likely not have similar incentives. As such, deeds of
easement are less likely to be recorded, making it harder to find such
encumbrances during a title search. By eliminating the common law rule and
allowing a grantor to reserve an easement in favor of a third party to the deed,
it becomes much easier to conduct a title search and precisely locate all
encumbrances.
Although the majority believed that the Springob deed was unambiguous,
an ambiguity clearly arises when the deed is given effect. 00 Moreover, the
majority's holding in Springob cannot be squared with the line of reasoning in
earlier South Carolina (and other states') opinions. By considering the
overwhelming evidence that Dr. Shenoy intended to create an appurtenant
easement burdening Lot 14 for the benefit of Lot 13 in perpetuity, the South
98. Smith, 312 S.C. at 467,441 S.E.2d at 336.
99. Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 578, 330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1985); see 12
S.C. Juius. Easements § 22 (1992).
100. See, e.g., Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S.C. 454,456,58 S.E. 420,421 (1907) (stating that
where deed ambiguities are latent, parol testimony is admissible to effectuate intent).
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Carolina Court of Appeals should have logically and rationally reached this
decision and effectuated the grantor's intent.
Reaching this conclusion, the court should have followed the cutting edge
lead of Judge Anderson in overruling the common law rule. South Carolina had
no problem finding that an interest may be reserved in a grantor's spouse who
is a stranger to the deed in Glasgow.' ' The time has come for the Supreme
Court of South Carolina to take a stand and overrule the antiquated common
law rule once and for all. The rule serves no modem purpose except to frustrate
the grantor's intent, which is the very result that the law tries to prevent. When
taken as a whole, the facts in Springob presented an excellent opportunity for
the South Carolina Supreme Court to clarify the easement law of South
Carolina. By denying certiorari, the court failed to overrule the common law
rule thus ignoring the ultimate consideration when interpreting a deed: to
effectuate the intent of the grantor.
John E. Lansche, Jr.
101. 221 S.C. 322, 70 S.E.2d 432 (1952).
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